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NOTES 
Prospective Waiver of the Right To Disqualify Counsel for 
Conflicts of Interest 
Attorneys1 must preserve the confidences of their clients while 
serving those clients with undivided loyalty. These are the com-
mands of canons 4 and 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.2 
To protect clients from attorney malfeasance and to ensure public 
confidence in the legal profession, the courts have erected a series of 
presumptions about attorney behavior that spare the client the need 
to prove actual violations of canons 4 and 5 where the potential for 
such violations exists. Two of these presumptions are particularly 
troublesome. Under canon 4, courts presume that lawyers within a 
law firm share the client's confidences with each other. And under 
canon 5, courts presume that an attorney who represents a client in 
one matter cannot act adversely to the client in an unrelated matter 
without diluting his loyalty to the client. The effect of these pre-
sumptions is often to permit clients to disqualify a law firm from 
representing an adverse party in litigation against them.3 
Although the primary purpose of canons 4 and 5 is to promote 
clients' interests, the tendency of the underlying presumptions to en-
courage use of disqualification motions as tactical litigation weap-
ons4 may in some cases harm clients. Consider the following 
1. The words "lawyer'' or "attorney," when used in this Note, refer to either a solo practi-
tioner or an entire law firm. When law firms are referred to, the discussion excludes solo 
practitioners. 
2. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canons 4 & 5. [The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, its Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules are hereinaf-
ter cited, respectively, as CODE, CANON, EC, and DR.] 
3. Law firms have sought to insulate themselves from disqualification motions based on 
canons 4 and 5 in a variety of ways. See O'Dea, The Lawyer-Client Relationship Reconsidered· 
Methods for Avoiding Col!flicts of Interest, Malpractice Liability, and .Disqual!ftcation, 48 GEO, 
WASH. L. REv. 693, 718 (1980). Some firms have attempted to show that the particular attor-
ney representing the adverse party did not in fact possess any of the client's confidences. See, 
e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1305 (N.D. Ill.), revd sub 
nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978). The firm may 
attempt to prove this by showing that that attorney had been "screened" from the client's 
affair. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 
F.2d 225,229 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977). See generally O'Dea, supra, at 710-18; Co=ent, The Chi-
nese Wall .Defense to Law-Firm .Disqua/!ftcation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 passim (1980), Courts 
have been reluctant to accept such proof, holding that as a matter of law the lawyers in a firm 
will be presumed to share each other's confidences. See note 17 infra and accompanying text. 
4. See, e.g., North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979), qffd., No. 79-7504 (2d Cir. Jan. 28, 1980) ("No purpose has been served by the instant 
[disqualification] motion other than to harass plaintiff and his counsel and to delay these pro-
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situation. A corporation greatly desires the expert advice and assist-
ance of a particular law firm on an upcoming matter. On approach-
ing the law firm, however, it is rebuffed: The firm is a large and 
growing one, and it believes that in the future it may want to repre-
sent other clients in lucrative litigation - related or unrelated to the 
instant matter - against the corporation. Because the firm knows it 
will be particularly susceptible to disqualification motions5 in later 
litigation if it accepts the corporation's business, it declines the re-
tainer.6 
The client in such a situation may be nonplussed. It may desire 
the firm's representation, even without the protection of the canon 4 
and 5 presumptions, much more than that of a different firm. Or it 
may firmly believe that the firm will not use confidences against the 
corporation, nor dilute its representation. Nevertheless, the corpora-
tion will be unable to hire the firm until it can off er some assurance 
that it will not disqualify the firm in later litigation. One possible 
solution is to have the client waive its right to disqualify the firm on 
canon 4 or 5 grounds. It is well settled that clients can consent to the 
law firm's adverse representation7 in a present, known matter ("spe-
cific waiver''). 8 But it remains unclear whether firms can further in-
sulate themselves by soliciting waivers with respect to future, as-yet-
ceedings further. The time has come to call a halt [to] those puerile litigation tactics."). See 
O'Dea, supra note 3, at 693-95. 
5. See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 210 (N.D. 
Ohio), o/fd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); G. HAzARD, 
ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 81 (1978); Comment, supra note 3, at 677; Note, Unchanging 
Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm Co,!flicts of Interest, 73 YALE 
LJ. 1058, 1068 (1964). See generally Brill, The Law Firm of-the Future, THE AM. LAW., Nov. 
1980, at 30. 
6. Two recent cases suggest this is not an altogether improbable scenario. See, e.g., Kenne-
cott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 78 Civ. 1295 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1978); City of 
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193,201 (N.D. Ohio), o/fd mem., 
573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). 
In Kennecott the law firm accepted the representation only after extracting a waiver from 
the client; in Cleveland it took considerable assurances from the client before the law firm 
would accept its business. See note 46 infra. 
7. Note that the client can never consent to its attorney's representation of an adverse party 
in the same matter in which the attorney is representing the client. See EC 5-15; ABA 
COMMN. ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT§ 1.7 and Comments at 57-58 (Discussion draft, Feb. 6, 1981) [hereinafter cited as 
NEW MODEL RULES). q: NEW MODEL RULES, supra, at § 2.2 and Comments at 133-34 (law-
yers may not serve as intermediarii;s where the common representation cannot be undertaken 
impartially). This Note addresses cases where: (a) the attorney might possess the client's con-
fidences by virtue of a present or former representation in a separate case (the canon 4 prob-
lem), or (b) the attorney may represent another party against the client while simultaneously 
representing the client in an unrelated matter (the canon 5 problem). 
8. See, e.g., Rossworm v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 468 F. Supp. 168 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); 
Gotwals v. Rencher, 60 Nev. 35, 98 P.2d 481 (1940). See note 73 infra; NEW MODEL RULES, 
supra note 7, at§ 1.9 and Comments at 81; ABA CoMMN. ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL 
STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT§ l.l0(c) and Comments at 36 (dis-
cussion draft, Jan. 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES); Note, Attorney's Co,!flict of 
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unknown adverse representations ("prospective waivers").9 This 
Note suggests an approach to prospective waivers that would enable 
clients to secure the representation they desire while protecting their 
canon 4 and 5 interests. 10 It recognizes that a client cannot waive the 
ethical obligations of canon 4; it cannot consent to the actual use of 
confidential information against itself. 11 Nor can it waive the duty 
of fidelity and independent judgment commanded by canon 5. 
Rather, this Note proposes that firms be permitted to seek prospec-
tive waivers of the presumptions of shared confidences and diluted 
loyalty that courts have created to protect clients' canon 4 and canon 
Interests: Representation of Interest Adverse to that of Former Client, 55 B.U. L. REV. 61, 83 
(1975). 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are the product of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. They represent the second "ma-
jor effort to modernize legal ethics since the former Canons of Ethics were promulgated in 
1908." Kutak, Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 36 Bus. LAW 573, 574 (1981), 
The first was the Code of Professional Responsibility, which the Model Rules are intended to 
supplant. The first discussion draft of the Model Rules was completed in January 1980 after 
which the commission held hearings and invited comments on the draft. In response to those 
comments, the commission released a second discussion draft in February 1981. Like the first, 
it consists of the proposed rules along with research notes summarizing the supporting authori-
ties for each provision. The commission hopes to release a completed final draft of the Model 
Rules by the late spring of 1981. Letter from Robert J. Kutak (Feb. 12, 1981) (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review). 
9. See O'Dea, supra note 3, at 728-29. Although neither the Code nor the New Model 
Rules directly addresses prospective waivers, some authority suggests they are unenforceable. 
See note 40 infra. 
10. This Note considers only express waivers, and not implied waivers or !aches. Some 
courts have denied motions to disqualify on theories of implied waiver and !aches. Compare, 
e.g., Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1978) 
(where more than two years had elapsed between the time the defendants became aware of the 
disqualification issue until the time they raised it before the trial court; defendants had specifi-
cally approved a screening program taken up by plaintiff's firm to remove the possibility of a 
conflict of interest, and it was not claimed that the screening was ineffective, held, defendants 
had waived their right to object to the conflict); Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 
1975) (late filing of disqualification motion at trial justified summary rejection of the motion); 
and Ernie Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,574 (2d Cir. 1973) ("in an extreme case, a 
party's delay in making a motion for disqualification may be given some weight"), wit/1 Em-
pire Linotype School, Inc. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (!aches cannot 
be taken into account in deciding the motion for disqualification, if the matter is at any time 
brought to the trial court's attention) and United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 
351 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (Laches cannot prevent an adjudication of the canon 4 disqualification 
issue once it is brought to the court's attention. Moreover, the doctrine of implied waiver 
cannot be used where the government is the motioning party, since the public interest is in-
volved.). 
11. See DR 4-10l(B)(2); EC 4-5; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 
221, 228 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1978). · But see NEW MODEL RULES, supra note 7, at § 1.9(a)(2). 
The court may take notice of an actual conflict even where the client does not move to 
disqualify opposing counsel. "[T]he Court, on its own motion, may disqualify an attorney for 
violation of the Canons of Ethics." Empire Linotype School, Inc. v. United States, 143 F. 
Supp. 627,631 (S.D.N.Y 1956) (dictum). See, e.g., In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Liti-
gation, 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976) (dictum); Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. Wash. 
1946). Cf. Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93, 98 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (any member of the Bar who is aware of a conflict of interest must present the 
matter to the proper forum). 
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5 interests. Part I of the Note discusses canon 4, first explaining the 
presumptions and policies that underlie it, then arguing that courts 
should enforce prospective waivers of the presumption of shared 
confidences when conditioned on the law firm's effective screening of 
client confidences - keeping them from the attorneys within the 
firm who will take part in the adverse representation. Part II turns to 
canon 5, and argues that prospective waivers of the presumption of 
diluted loyalties should be enforced against clients moving to dis-
qualify law firms for a canon 5 violation. 
l. CANON FOUR 
Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands 
attorneys to "preserve the confidences and secrets" of their clients. 
The Code specifically prohibits attorneys from using "information 
acquired in the course of the representation of a client to the disad-
vantage of the client."12 Upon the client's motion, courts will dis-
qualify attorneys from adverse litigation when necessary to protect 
the client's canon 4 rights. In particular, disqualification will ensue 
whenever an attorney is retained to bring suit against a client that 
the attorney then represents, or has represented, in a separate yet 
"substantially related" matter.13 
The purpose of canon 4 is to "encourage clients fully and freely 
to make known to their attorneys all facts pertinent to their case."14 
The adversary system of justice requires such freedom of consulta-
tion.15 Clients would be reluctant to confide in their attorneys if they 
feared that they could not prevent their confidences from later being 
used against them. To assure clients that this will not happen, courts 
do not require proof that an attorney is actually using a client's16 
confidences against the client before disqualifying the attorney from 
representation adverse to the client.17 Instead, the courts have 
12. EC 4-5. See DR 4-IOl(B)(2); EC 4-1. 
13. See, e.g., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 223-24 (7th Cir. 1978). The significance of the "substantially 
related" test is discussed at notes 19-20 iefra and accompanying text. 
14. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 
1953). 
15. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS, No. 287 (1953) 
(interpreting then canon 6, the precursor to the current canon 4). See Arkansas v. Dean Foods 
Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled in part on other grounds, In re Multi-
Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980) (en bane}, vacated sub nom. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 49 U.S.L.W. 4089 (Jan. 13, 1981); Note, The Allomey-
Client Privilege After Allorney .Disclosure, 78 MICH. L. REV. 927, 934 (1980). But see Noonan, 
The Purpose of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1489 (1966). 
16. Canon 4 protects both present and former clients. The termination of the attorney-
client relationship does not end the attorney's obligation to preserve the confidences of his 
former client. EC 4-6. 
11. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 384 (8th Cir. 1979), over-
ruled in part on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th 
1078 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:1074 
erected a series of presumptions to protect clients in cases of poten-
tial canon 4 conflicts.18 These presumptions encourage confidential 
disclosures by assuring the client that he can disqualify an attorney 
in every case where he might reasonably fear that his confidences 
will be used against him. The first canon 4 presumption created by 
the courts is that attorneys learn confidences in the course of the at-
torney-client relationship. Clients need not prove that they actually 
disclosed any confidences; rather, "[t]he attorney-client relationship 
raises an irrebuttable presumption that confidences were dis-
closed." 19 Second, courts presume that the confidences disclosed are 
prejudicial and will be used against the client whenever the subject 
matter of the representation between the attorney and client is "sub-
stantially related" to the subject matter of the adverse representa-
tion.20 Finally, courts presume that attorneys share prejudicial 
confidences with associates and partners within their firm.21 
Two rationales underlie these presumptions. One is the likeli-
hood that the presumed conduct will occur:22 clients are likely to 
Cir. 1980) (en bane), vacated sub. nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 49 U.S.L.W. 
4089 (Jan. 13, 1981); Government oflndia v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 
1978); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,571 (2d Cir. 1973); Consolidated Thea-
tres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 925 (2d Cir. 1954); T.C. 
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
18. See O'Dea, supra note 3, at 706 n.66; Comment, supra note 3, at 682 n.24 and cases 
cited therein; Note, .Disqual!ftcation of Attorneys For Representing Interests Adverse to Former 
Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917, 918-21 (1955). 
19. Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977). Accord, Arkansas 
v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 384 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled in part on other grounds, 
In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980) (en bane), vacated 
sub. nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 49 U.S.L.W. 4089 (Jan. 13, 1981). But see 
City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193,209 (N.D. Ohio), affd 
mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978) (holding that the pre-
sumption is rebuttable). • 
20. The "substantially related" test originated in T.C. Theatre Corp. V. Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (Weinfeld, J.), and since then has been followed 
in the Second and Seventh Circuits. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 
221, 223-24 (7th Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit, e.g., Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 
1322, 1325 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976), and the Third Circuit, e.g., Akerly v. 
Red Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 544 n.12 (3d Cir. 1977), also follow this test. The Second 
Circuit has refined the "substantially related" test to grant disqualification "only when the 
issues involved have been 'identical' or 'essentially the same.'" Government of India v. Cook 
Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978). 
21. Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 864 (W.D. Mo. 1980); DR 5-105(D). Compare, 
e.g., Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods., Co., 605 F.2d 380, 386 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled in par/ 
on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(en bane), vacated sub. nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 49 U.S.L.W. 4089 (Jan. 
13, 1981), and Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1955) 
(presumption of shared confidences is irrebutable), with Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S 
v. Baxter Travenal Laboratories, 607 F.2d 186, 196-97 (7th Cir. 1979) (en bane) and Silver 
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754-56 (2d Cir. 1975) (al-
lowing rebuttal of presumption of shared confidences). 
22. For a discussion of the role of probability in canon 4 presumptions, see Liebman, The 
Changing Law of .Disqual!ftcation: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 996, 
1002 & nn.27 & 28 (1979). 
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disclose confidences to their attorneys;23 attorneys are likely to use 
confidences that they have learned;24 and lawyers within a firm are 
likely to discuss cases and clients with each other.25 The second 
arises from the difficulty of proving that the attorney has or is using 
confidences learned from the client. 26 Courts fear that requiring 
such proof would undermine the canon 4 policy of encouraging 
clients to confide freely in their attorneys. "Such a requirement 
would put the former client to the Robson's choice of either having 
to disclose his privileged information in order to diqualify his 
former attorney or having to refrain from the disqualifica-
tion motion altogether."27 Rather than risk such public expo-
23. See Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Prefessionals: Its Implica-
tions for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1232 & n.38 (1962). 
24. Even if they do not deliberately use confidences against a client, attorneys may find it 
difficult to erect "Chinese walls in their own minds between what is confidential and what is 
not." NCK Org., Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1976). "Even the most rigorous 
self-discipline might not prevent a lawyer from unconsciously using or manipulating a confi-
dence acquired in the earlier representation and transforming it into a telling advantage in the 
sub,,;equent litigation." Ernie Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973). 
Accord, T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 
1953). 
25. "It is reasonable to presume that members of a law firm freely share their client's confi-
dences with one another. That presumption of shared confidences underlies, either implicitly 
or explicitly, many of the cases requiring the disqualification of counsel." Novo Terapeutisk 
Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1979) (en 
bane). Accord, Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir. 1979), over-
ruled in part on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th 
Cir. 1980) (en bane), vacated sub. nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 49 U.S.L.W. 
4089 (Jan. 13, 1981). 
Lawyers are most likely to share confidences in small firms that represent clients in a broad 
spectrum of matters. The presumption of shared confidences "may be unrealistic when the 
firms are large or where the clients are represented only for limited purposes." MODEL RULES, 
supra note 8, Comment at 109. Accord, Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 751-54 (2d Cir. 1975); Liebman, supra note 22, at 1018. Moreover, the 
presumption ignores the differential access to confidential information of partners and associ-
ates, and may not accurately describe the relations between lawyers in associations other than 
law firms, such as government agencies. See MODEL RULES, supra. 
26. Even if the client knows what confidences it has disclosed to its personal attorney, it 
will not ordinarily know what he has disclosed to his colleagues. q: Novo Terapeutisk 
Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenal Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 196-97'(7th Cir. 1979) 
(en bane) (court allowed presumption to be rebutted where client could easily discover 
whether confidences had in fact been shared and where client's attorney had failed to allege 
confidences had in fact been shared). "Moreover, the client may have forgotten a number of 
facts disclosed to the attorney over a lengthy professional relationship which may nevertheless 
be of advantage to the subsequent client with an adverse interest." Note, supra note 8, at 76. 
Finally, a client may find it difficult to disprove the attorney who admits he possesses confi-
dences but swears he is not using them. 
27. Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978). Accord, 
Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977); Ernie Indus., Inc. v. 
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Such an inquiry would prove destructive of 
the weighty policy considerations that serve as the pillars of canon 4 of the Code, for the 
client's ultimate and compelled response to an attorney's claim of non-access [or non-use] 
would necessarily be to describe in detail the confidential information previously disclosed and 
now sought to be preserved."); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 
1080 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:1074 
sure28 of their confidences, clients might choose to forgo disclosure 
altogether. 29 
Courts will not disqualify attorneys from every case that presents 
the possibility of a canon 4 violation. Where the reasons for the 
above presumptions do not apply, disqualification is not required. 
For example, courts allow rebuttal of all three presumptions where 
the client knowingly consents to a specific, present adverse represen-
tation, permitting the attorney to proceed against the client.30 The 
client making such a specific waiver knows the subject matter of the 
adverse representation. The client also knows what information it 
has disclosed to the attorney, and thus can readily determine 
whether the attorney possesses any confidences that can be used 
against the client.31 It is unlikely that a client would give a specific 
canon 4 waiver if it knew that it had disclosed any damaging confi-
dences to the attorney,32 or if the benefits of consenting to the attor-
ney's request did not exceed the costs. In short, the very fact that the 
client is willing to waive reduces the probability that the attorney 
possesses any dangerous confidences.33 Consequently, the presump-
tions that prejudicial confidences were disclosed and shared with 
other attorneys within a firm have little rational basis where the cli-
ent has issued a specific canon 4 waiver. 34 
265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 
F.2d 751, 759 (2d Cir. 1975) (Adams, J., concurring). 
28. Even in camera hearings on the disqualification motion would not adequately safe-
guard the client's confidences. First of all, the client may wish to shield his secrets from the 
trial judge. See Note, supra note 8, at 76. Second, such hearings may simply be unfeasible. 
See, e.g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 
920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954). But see First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 
211 n.6 (7th Cir. 1978) (en bane); Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 741 
(2d Cir. 1978) (Mansfield, J., concurring). 
29. See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193,206 (N.D. 
Ohio), qffd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). 
30. See, e.g., Rossworm v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 468 F. Supp. 168 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); 
Gotwals v. Rencher, 60 Nev. 35, 98 P.2d 481 (1940). 
31. To the extent the Code ever permits waiver, it does so only after the attorney has fully 
disclosed the nature of his representation to the client. See DR 4-IOl(c)(I); EC 4-2; MODEL 
RULES, supra note 8, Comments at 36. 
32. See In re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976) 
("A former client may consent to the employment of the attorney by an adverse party ... 
typically ... where the former client realizes that any prior disclosures will not prejudice him 
in the new case."). 
33. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221,229 n.8 (7th Cir. 1978). See 
In re Yam Proces~ing Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976). However, the client 
may have forgotten what he has disclosed. See Note, supra note 26. 
34. Specific canon 4 waivers should be enforced only where the fact that the client granted 
the waiver strongly implies that the attorney receiving the waiver possesses no potentially 
harmful confidences. While this implication is logical where the waiver is granted by one of 
the attorney's former clients, it is much weaker where the waiver is granted by one of the 
attorney's present clients. A present client, unlike a former client, has a strong interest in 
remaining on good terms with his attorney. An attorney could use this interest to pressure a 
present client to grant a specific canon 4 waiver even though the attorney possesses potentially 
harmful confidences. Such a waiver would then be based on trust, rather than on the attor-
April 1981) Note - Prospective Waiver 1081 
Similarly, courts have allowed rebuttal of the presumption that 
attorneys share confidences within their firm in cases where the at-
torney sought to be disqualified is no longer associated with the law-
yer or law firm that formerly represented the client. 35 These cases 
typically arise when a younger attorney leaves a large established 
firm for a smaller one. Should the attorney's new firm later repre-
sent parties in litigation against one of the larger firm's clients, the 
client may move to disqualify the smaller firm. Two factors underlie 
the decisions to allow rebuttal of the shared confidences presumption 
in these cases. One is the public interest in attorney mobility: "[t]he 
importance of not unnecessarily constricting the careers of lawyers 
who started their practice of law at large firms simply on the basis of 
their former association .... "36 A second is that two of the reasons 
underlying the presumption simply do not apply: there is a reduced 
risk that confidences have been or will be shared because the dissoci-
ated attorney has no access to the files of his former law firm's client, 
and there is an increased likelihood that the client can prove that its 
confidences were shared. The dissociated attorney's former law firm 
will almost always be the one pressing the disqualification motion on 
behalf of one of its established clie:nts.37 Because that firm is likely 
to know whether the dissociated attorney learned any of the client's 
confidences while working there, it will probably be able to prove 
whether any confidences were in fact shared.38 Hence, an irrebut-
ney's nonpossession of dangerous confidences. Inherent in such situations is the risk that these 
confidences may be used against the waiving client in the litigation to which he has consented 
- the adverse representation. Such a risk is also inherent in the prospective canon 4 waiver 
setting. There, however, the client gains his choice of counsel - and this benefit 
counterbalances the slightly increased risk to his canon 4 rights. But the present client who 
grants a specific canon 4 waiver gains nothing - he already has his choice of counsel. And 
canon 2 obligates the attorney to continue the representation until the matter in which the 
attorney represents the client has concluded. Specific canon 4 waivers by present clients 
should therefore remain unenforceable. 
35. See, e.g., Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1976); Gas-A-Tron v. 
Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Silver Chrysler 
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally Note, 
supra note 8. See also Akerly v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 543-44 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(refusal to disqualify co-counsel). But see Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 
385 (8th Cir. 1979). 
36. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 
1975). See NEW MODEL RULES, supra note 7, at§ 5.1 and Comments at 187-88. Other inter-
ests that have been deemed sufficiently weighty to allow rebuttal of the presumption of shared 
confidences include the interest of the attorney's present client in keeping that attorney and the 
interest of the attorney in maintaining his reputation. Government of India v. Cook Indus., 
Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1978) (Mansfield, J., concurring). 
37. See, e.g., Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). 
38. See, e.g., Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 
607 F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir. 1979) (en bane); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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table presumption is unnecessary in dissociated attorney cases39 to 
protect the client's canon 4 rights.40 
Applying these two series of cases to the problem of prospective 
waivers of canon 4 will enable us to decide which of the presump-
tions should be relaxed in that situation. Although no court has 
squarely addressed the issue, the weight of authority appears to bar 
enforcement of prospective, as opposed to specific, canon 4 waiv-
ers.41 Such a rule makes sense in the context of the presumption that 
the client has shared prejudicial confidences with the attorney. Un-
like the client issuing a specific waiver, the client issuing a prospec-
tive waiver cannot know what confidences he will in the future 
disclose, or in what adverse representations the attorney may engage. 
This ignorance supports the rational basis for the presumptions that 
the attorney has and will use the client's prejudicial confidences in a 
substantially related adverse representation. Thus, courts should not 
enforce prospective waivers of these presumptions. But prospective 
waivers of the presumption42 that all attorneys in a firm representing 
39. The courts have also allowed rebuttal of a presumption that attorneys within a firm or 
department shared confidences outside of canon 4 cases - for example, in former government 
attorney cases. The Code prohibits former government attorneys from representing private 
clients in matters for which the attorney had substantial responsibility in public employ. DR 
9-lOl(B). Unlike canon 4 cases, ''The ethical problem raised here ... does not stem from the 
breach of confidentiality bred by a conflict of interest but from the possibility that a lawyer 
might wield Government power with a view toward subsequent private gain." General Mo• 
tors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 n.20 (2d Cir. 1974). To eliminate that 
possibility, courts recognize a presumption of shared confidences and disqualify the firm with 
which the lawyer is associated. However, recent cases have allowed firms to defend against 
disqualification motions by proof of effective screening of the former government attorney. 
E.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en bane), vacated sub nom. Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 49 U.S.L.W. 3514 (Jan. 19, 1981); Central Milk Producers Coop. 
v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1978); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 
791 (Ct. Cl. 1977). Accord, NEW MODEL RULES, supra note 7, at§ 1.10 and Comments at 92-
93; Note, .Disqualification "Screening" to Rebut the Automatic Law Firm .Disqual!ficatio11 Rule, 
82 DICK. L. REv. 625 (1978). The reasoning underlying these cases is the fear that to not allow 
rebuttal could "hamper the government's efforts to hire qualified attorneys; the latter may fear 
that government service will transform them into legal Typhoid Marys, shunned by prospec-
tive private employers because hiring them may result in the disqualification of an entire firm 
in a possibly wide range of cases." Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 443 (footnote omitted). 
40. The dissociated attorney opinions implicitly hold that allowing rebuttal of the pre-
sumption of shared confidences will not undermine public confidence in attorney confidential-
ity. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d 
Cir. 1975) ("Nor are such broad measures required to maintain 'in the public mind, a high 
regard for the legal profession' .... ") (citation omitted). For an argument that enforcement 
of prospective waivers of the presumption of shared confidences will not undermine public 
confidence, see notes 62-63 infra and accompanying text. 
41. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221,229 & n.9 (7th Cir. 
1978) (prohibiting prospective canon 4 waivers should they fail adequately to protect the waiv-
ing client's confidences); NEW MODEL RULES, supra note 7, at§ l.9{a){2) and Comments at 81 
("A waiver is effective only if there is disclosure of the circumstances, including the lawyer's 
intended role in behalf of the new client"; such disclosure is impossible with respect to future 
and as-yet-unknown adverse representations.). 
42. The presumption is usually held irrebuttable when the attorney sought to be disquali-
fied remains associated with the attorney to whom the client disclosed confidences. See, e.g., 
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a client have knowledge of the client's confidences are a different 
matter. This presumption was created both to protect the particular 
client and to ensure public confidence in the confidentiality of the 
attorney-client relationship.43 As in the dissociated attorney cases, 
courts should weaken this presumption where clients have given pro-
spective waivers, because there is both a countervailing interest that 
is served by allowing rebuttal,44 and, with certain safeguards, a sig-
nificantly lower risk that confidences have been shared with those 
attorneys within the firm who will represent the adverse party 
against the client. In addition, enforcement of these prospective ca-
non 4 waivers will not undermine public confidence in attorney con-
fidentiality. 
In the dissociated attorney cases, the interest served by allowing 
rebuttal of the presumption of shared confidences is attorney mobil-
ity. In the prospective waiver case, clients rather than attorneys will 
benefit, for they will enjoy greater freedom in choice of counsel. The 
clients that will benefit are those that law firms would be unwilling to 
represent without such a waiver (''waiving clients").45 The law firm's 
Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 385-86 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled in part on 
other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980) (en 
bane), vacated sub. nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 49 U.S.L.W. 4081 (Jan. 13, 
1981); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977). See also Schloetter 
v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1976). The Second Circuit has narrowed the 
presumption by applying it rebuttably where the attorney has dissociated himself from the firm 
possessing the confidences, and it is shown that the attorney sought to be disqualified is shown 
to have had no more than a "peripheral" involvement in the former case while employed at 
the firm possessing the confidences. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975); Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 422 F. 
Supp. 1057, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), ajfd., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978); Note, The Second 
Circuit And Attorney .Disqualtftcation-Silver Chrysler Steers In A New .Direction, 44 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 130 (1975). See generally Note,supra note 8, at 70-71. One court characterizes 
the Second Circuit as having "rejected the harsh, hard-line approach ofirrebuttably imputing 
confidential disclosures . . . in favor of the more realistically equitable logic, attuned to con-
temporary legal practices common to emerging law firms of substantial size." City of Cleve-
land v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 210 (N.D. Ohio), ajfd. mem., 573 
F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). 
43. See notes 23-29 supra and accompanying text. 
44. The rule of attorney-client confidentiality is not absolute. For example, an attorney 
may disclose "the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to 
prevent the crime," DR 4-I0I(c)(3), and "[c]onfidences or secrets necessary to establish or 
collect his fee." DR 4-10l(c)(4). The Model Rules go further and provide that an attorney 
may disclose confidences "to prevent or rectify the consequences of a deliberately wrongful act 
by his client." MODEL RULES, supra note 8, at § l.7(c). In those cases, the chilling effect of a 
disclosure on client confidences is outweighed by the interests in public safety and the financial 
security of the legal profession. 
45. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 78 Civ. 1255, slip op. 
at 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. IO, 1978) (law firm insisted on waiver as condition of representation). 
The "non-waiving client" also benefits from enforcement of canon 4 waivers. This is a 
client with interests adverse to the waiving client that seeks representation from the same law 
firm. Such dual representation is impossible without enforceable waivers. If an attorney rep-
resents a client without securing a waiver from the client, then an attorney cannot subse-
quently represent another party against the client. The attorney should refuse to represent the 
other party and force that party to pick another, less satisfactory counsel Should the attorney 
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request for a waiver may be made either to new clients or to existing 
clients as a condition of continued representation.46 The client bene-
fits because the law firm may have special skills or expertise that the 
client needs.47 Any client that seeks the skills or expertise of a partic-
ular law firm would benefit from enforcement of canon 4 waivers 
because without the waiver the client would have to seek different, 
and perhaps less competent, counsel. 
A second reason to allow prospective waiver of the canon 4 pre-
sumption of shared confidences is that, like the dissociated attorney 
cases, prospective waiver cases may present a reduced risk that confi-
dences will in fact be shared. The risk is lower because the waivers 
can be conditioned on effective screening of the "tainted" attor-
neys.48 Such screening can prevent unintentional sharing of confi-
nevertheless accept the other party's retainer, the attorney could be disqualified from suit upon 
the first client's motion. The other party would then lose not only its first choice of counsel, 
but also suffer some inconvenience and hardship: 
A client whose attorney is disqualified incurs a loss of time and money in being com-
pelled to retain new counsel who m tum have to become familiar with the prior compre-
hensive investigation which is the core of modem complex litigation. The client moreover 
may lose the benefit of its longtime counsel's specialized knowledge of its operations. 
Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978). Accord, Board of 
Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Note, supra note 8, at 65. Enforcement 
of the canon 4 waiver, however, would enable the nonwaiving client to secure its choice of 
counsel. Arguably, this interest weighs in favor of enforcement. See Central Mille Producers 
Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 991-92 (8th Cir. 1978); NCK Org. Ltd, v. 
Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1976); Em.le Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 
564-65 (2d Cir. 1973); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 861 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (in ruling on 
disqualification motion, court should consider "a client's interest in retaining his chosen coun-
sel"). 
46. The Code limits the power of attorneys to withdraw from representation of a client. 
An attorney may violate these provisions by threatening to withdraw from a pending matter 
unless the client issues a waiver with respect to future adverse representations. See DR 2-110; 
NEW MODEL RULES, mpra note 7, at§ 1.15 and co=ents at 116-17, 119. However, the cli-
ent's interest in keeping its present firm may be as great as its interest in retaining a new one, 
see Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978), and thus 
enforcement of waivers executed by such clients would also be beneficial. But see text follow-
ing note 54 infra. 
47. For example, in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 
193 (N.D. Ohio), qffd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978), 
the City of Cleveland sought to disqualify the law firm of Squire, Sanders and Dempsey 
(SS&D) from representing the defendants in an antitrust suit. SS&D at that time also repre-
sented Cleveland as bond counsel. SS&D had initially declined to represent the City as bond 
counsel because of the potential for such conflict. SS&D's expertise as bond lawyers was so 
great, though, that the City persisted and eventually prevailed upon SS&D to accept the City's 
bond work. Although SS&D did not seek a formal waiver from the City as consideration for 
accepting the City's retainer, the Court found that the City had waived its objections to 
SS&D's continued representation of the electric company. 
48. A typical waiver might read: "I waive my right to disqualify any of your attorneys who 
have been effectively screened from knowledge disclosed by me in the course of the attorney-
client relationship." A waiver phrased in terms of presumptions, which are simply rules of 
evidence, would be less intelligible to laymen. However, courts should treat the purported 
canon 4 waiver as a waiver of the presumption, and not the underlying rights. 
Theoretically, screening could work in a two-man law firm. However, screening may be 
unworkable in such small firms, where lawyers are more likely to discuss cases with each other 
than in large firms. See note 25 mpra. Large firms that have specialized departments and that 
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dences, and other safeguards can reduce the risk of intentional 
violations. Several courts have recognized that effective screening is 
possible within law firms.49 Analogously, multiservice .financial in-
stitutions erect so-called "Chinese Walls" between their commercial 
and trust departments.50 Large, departmentalized law firms can as 
readily erect such screening devices as banks.51 A screening program 
might work in the following way: the law firm would draw up a list 
of attorneys who will do all the work for the client. Those attorneys 
alone would have access to the client's files. The firm would instruct 
them not to discuss the client's affairs with anyone in the firm save 
for the other screened attorneys. If the firm then represents another 
client in litigation against the first client, only the screened attorneys 
would be barred from that representation. 52 The opportunity that 
clients will have to inspect a law firm's screening procedures before 
issuing a waiver increases the likelihood that the screening will be 
effective. 53 
Although screening devices can prevent unintentional and acci-
dental sharing of confidences, they may fail to prevent intentional 
leaks. Moreover, s~ch leaks may be difficult to detect. Forcing the 
client to prove that leaks have occurred raises the same problems 
occupy physically large and sometimes geographically separate offices will find screening pro-
grams easier and more practical to implement. Moreover, the potential for conflicts is greatest 
in the large firms. See note 5 supra. Courts should therefore take into account the size of the 
firm when deciding whether a waiver conditioned on screening would be effective. 
49. See, e.g., cases cited in note 38 supra. Although those cases involved former govern-
ment attorneys, "Chinese Walls" in law firms can just as effectively seal off an attorney who 
has learned confidential information from a private client as they can seal off the former gov-
ernment attorney. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 453 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part), vacated sub nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ris-
jord, 49 U.S.L.W. 3514 (Jan. 19, 1981). 
50. The SEC has approved such "Chinese Walls" to prevent the flow of confidences from 
one department to the other. See Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, [1967-1969 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 77,629. See generally Comment, supra note 3, at 705-08. 
Without screening, a trust officer could use information about a corporate customer of the 
commercial department in deciding whether to buy or sell securities issued by that customer. 
Most commentators endorse screening devices in banks as an aid in facing the conflicts 
problems that these institutions face. See Herzel & Conning, The Chinese Wall and Co,!flicts of 
Interest in .Banks, 34 Bus. LAW. 73, 75 n.2 (1978). See generally Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese 
Wall Solution to the Co,!flict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459, 462 n.7 
(1975); Mendez-Penate, The .Bank "Chinese Wall':· Resolving and Contending with Co,!flicts of 
.Duties, 93 BANKING L.J. 674 (1976). 
51. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 n.28 (7th 
Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Liebman, supra note 22, at 1017-18. 
52. For two reasons, it is unlikely that a law firm would request canon 4 waivers condi-
tioned on screening from a large number of clients. First, screening programs are inefficient. 
A law firm that has many of its lawyers tied up in screening programs is hindered in assigning 
those lawyers as the need arises. Second, they are inconvenient. The more screening programs 
a law firm has, the more difficult it will be for lawyers to remember what they can talk about 
with whom over lunch. 
53. q. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 229 n.10 (2d Cir. 
1977) (disallowing screening defense where client had no opportunity to inspect or consent to 
the screening process). 
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that the presumption of shared confidences was intended to cure. 54 
These problems may be mitigated in three ways. First, the waiver 
should be enforced only against new clients and not against continu-
ing clients. That is, a client should only be able to issue a prospec-
tive canon 4 waiver upon initially retaining the law firm, and not as 
consideration for continued representation by the firm. This require-
ment eliminates the possibility that the client's confidences were 
shared within the firm before it instituted the screening program, and 
precludes a law firm's potential defense that a particular "unreported 
screening leak" was actually a confidence shared before implementa-
tion of the program. Second, courts can reduce the risk to the client 
by allowing the client to void the waiver with proof of a single, unre-
ported leak in the screen. This procedure protects the client while 
allowing the law firm to preserve the enforceability of the waiver in 
the case of an accidental leak.55 Finally, courts should require the 
firm to return the client's files in inactive matters.56 This require-
ment would reduce the opportunity for both accidental and inten-
tional screening violations. 57 
Despite these requirements, some risk still remains that the firm 
will intentionally use confidential information against the client, and 
that such use will remain undetected.58 To ensure that the client un-
derstands this risk and intelligently decides whether its need for that 
particular law firm justifies taking the risk, two additional safeguards 
are required. First, the client should have the advice of independent 
counsel in executing the waiver.59 An independent counsel could in-
telligently evaluate the quality of the firm's screening program and 
54. See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text. 
55. If a confidence was accidentally leaked to a nonscreened attorney, the firm would then 
have to screen off the attorneys tainted by the leak from any representation against the client. 
This rule protects the honest firm from disqualification because of accidental leaks. 
56. See, e.g., Rossworm v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 468 F. Supp. 168 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(firm returned client's files to assure confidentiality). 
57. Courts might further reduce the temptation to breach the "Chinese Wall" by limiting 
the waiver's applicability to those adverse parties that were represented by the firm at the ti!)le 
of waiver. This requirement would remove the temptation the firm might otherwise have had 
to use the lure of confidential information to attract new clients. See, e.g., In re Boone, 83 F. 
944 (N.D. Cal. 1887). It would also avoid any appearance of impropriety that might arise were 
the law firm to represent several new clients in litigation against the waiving client. Yet such a 
restriction would severely restrict the utility of waivers in cases where they are most needed-
where a client seeks representation from a large, specialized law firm that has a rapidly grow-
ing practice, and hence fears numerous future conflicts. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 78 Civ. 1295 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1978); City of Cleveland v. Cleve-
land Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio), qffd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). 
58. Although even the best screening program cannot stop intentional leaks, there is al-
ways some risk of intentional disclosure of confidences even without waivers. A dishonest law 
firm can always try to sell its confidences to a party adverse to the client. 
59. Many corporate clients will be able to use their in-house counsel for this purpose. See 
generally For Lawyers: An Inside Job, Bus. WEEK, Sept. I, 1980, at 70-71. 
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weigh the need for that particular law firm against the risk of 
waiver.60 Second, waivers should be enforced only if contained in a 
formal writing signed by the law firm, the client, and the client's in-
dependent counsel.61 The formality of the waiver agreement will 
impress upon the client the significance of his actions and discourage 
unnecessary risk taking. 62 Moreover, such a writing will provide evi-
dence that the client received independent legal advice before exe-
cuting the waiver. 
Finally, the need to preserve public confidence in attorney-client 
confidentiality does not preclude enforcement of prospective waivers 
of the canon 4 shared confidences presumption. The policy favoring 
preservation of public confidence is embodied in both canon 4 and 
canon 9, and courts have erected the presumption of shared confi-
dences in part to promote this policy.63 The presumption does so by 
assuring clients that they need not disclose confidences in order to 
prevent the use of those confidences against them. But it is unlikely 
that the public will lose faith in its ability to share confidences with 
attorneys once it realizes that the prospective waiver proposed here is 
entirely voluntary and exists solely to benefit the client. No client 
60. Cf. In re Anderson, 52 Ill.2d 202,206, 287 N.E.2d 682, 684 (1972) ("[W]hen an attor-
ney engages in a transaction with a client during the attorney-client relationship and benefits 
thereby, in order to show that the benefit he received did not proceed from undue influence, he 
must prove . . . that the client had independent advice before completing the transaction."). 
61. See O'Dea, supra note 3, at 734. 
62. See R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, PALMER'S CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION 102-03 (3d ed. 1978). 
63. Canon 9 tells lawyers to "avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety." 
CODE, supra note 2, Canon 9. When a lawyer represents a party against another of his clients, 
arguably the ensuing "appearance of impropriety" should require disqualification indepen-
dently of the co=ands of canon 4. However, the disqualification rules under canon 4 already 
reflect judicial concern for public confidence in the legal profession. See Emle Indus., Inc. v. 
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973). As this concern is the "raison d'etre for Canon 
9's 'appearance-of-evil' doctrine," General Motors Corp v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 
649 (2d Cir. 1974), it follows that the presumption of shared confidences incorporates the pol-
icy underlying canon 9. See, e.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 
225, 234-35 (2d Cir. 1977); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,571 (2d Cir. 1973). 
See generally Note, Appearance of Impropriety As the Sole Ground far JJisqual!ftcation, 31 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1516, 1518 (1977). To the extent waivers of this presumption satisfy the poli-
cies of canon 4, as this Note argues, they also satisfy canon 9. 
Furthermore, a number of courts have recognized that canon 9 cannot independently sup-
port disqualification. "[W]hen there is no claim that the trial will be tainted, appearance of 
impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order except in the 
rarest cases." Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979). Accord, Interna-
tional Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975); City of Cleveland v. Cleve-
land Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193,205 (N.D. Ohio), o/fd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). See ABA COMMN. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, 
FORMAL OPINION, No. 342 (1975). See generally Liebman, supra note 22; O'Dea, supra note 3, 
at 708-10; O'Toole, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical 
Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 313 (1979). The costs of disqualification in unnecessary delay 
and prejudice to the party separated from the counsel of its choice, see Board of Educ. v. 
Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1246, outweigh any possible harm to the legal profession's public image. 
Therefore, canon 9 should not independently require disqualification. 
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need fear even limited disclosure unless it voluntarily agrees to 
waive the presumption. 64 And no client will do so unless it finds that 
the benefit in choice of counsel outweighs the risk. The elaborate 
safeguards attending these waivers should further assure the general 
public that their confidences are safe. 
In conclusion, courts should enforce prospective waivers of the 
canon 4 presumption of shared confidences subject to the following 
conditions: (1) the waiver should be conditioned on effective screen-
ing between the attorneys handling the client's affairs and other at-
torneys in the firm; (2) it should only be issued by a client upon 
retaining a new law firm; (3) the client should have the advice of 
independent counsel in executing the waiver; ( 4) the waiver should 
take the form of a signed writing; and (5) the law firm should return 
the client's files to the client after the representation has ended. 
Proof of these elements would place the burden on the client to show 
that the attorney representing the adverse party actually possessed 
prejudicial confidences disclosed by the client. 65 The client could 
not simply prove that it had disclosed confidences to other lawyers in 
the firm; once waived, the presumption of shared confidences should 
disappear. 66 
II. CANON FIVE 
Canon 567 requires that lawyers "exercise independent profes-
sional judgment on behalf of a client." This canon absolutely pro-
hibits divided loyalties: under no circumstances may an attorney 
represent both the plaintiff and defendant in a litigation, or multiple 
parties with adverse interests in any other matter.68 Courts have in-
terpreted canon 5 to require disqualification where the lawyer repre-
sents the client in one matter, and simultaneously represents an 
adverse party against the client in any other matter, related or unre-
64. Waiver cases are distinguishable from cases where the law firm defends against a mo• 
tion to disqualify by proving it has erected an intra-firm "Chinese Wall." In those cases, the 
client has not consented to nor had any opportunity to inspect the screening device. Allowing 
such defenses would lead other clients to fear that their confidences will be jeopardized. See 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 955 (1978). By comparison, enforcement of waivers threatens no client that does not 
agree to a waiver. 
65. If the client proves that the particular attorney representing the adverse party possesses 
the client's confidences, then the court should presume that the attorney will use those confi• 
dences against the client and should grant the motion to disqualify. See notes 20 & 24 supra 
and accompanying text. 
66. Because the waiver is conditional, the attorney's failure to fulfill the condition of effec• 
tive screening would render the waiver ineffective. See Bugg v. Chevron Chem. Co., 224 Ga. 
809, 165 S.E.2d 135 (1968). This Note suggests that proof of even one unreported leak in the 
screen should void the waiver and restore the presumption. See note 54 supra and accompa-
nying text. 
67. CODE, supra note 2, Canon 5. 
68. See note 7 supra. 
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lated. 69 The theory is that such dual representation may dilute the 
attorney's loyalty and cause him to temper his representation of the 
client in even an unrelated matter.70 To preserve public and client 
confidence in attorney loyalty, courts recognize an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of diluted loyalty in such cases, and do not require the 
client to show that its attorney has actually tempered his representa-
tion.71 
Without prospective waivers of the canon 5 presumption of di-
luted loyalties, prospective waivers of the canon 4 presumption of 
shared confidences lose much of their utility to the law firm seeking 
the waiver. The problem is that the law firm may be unable to pre-
dict what form its future representation against the client might take. 
It may represent another party against the client while simultane-
ously representing the client in another unrelated matter, thereby 
presenting a canon 5 conflict.72 Or, after it no longer represents the 
waiving client, the law firm may represent another party against the 
waiving client in a matter substantially related to the law firm's past 
representation of the waiving client. This would present a canon 4 
conflict. If the law firm knows that the client will be a "one-shot" 
client that will no longer retain the firm after a single matter is set-
tled, it may be willing to accept only a prospective canon 4 waiver. 
But where the client seeks long-term representation, the law firm will 
likely insist on a prospective waiver of the canon 5 presumptions as 
69. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[A] possible effect 
on the quality of the attorney's services on behalf of the client being sued may be a diminution 
in the vigor of his representation of the client in the other matter''); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Ciner-
ama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976); Grievance Commn. v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 
203 A.2d 82 (1964); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978); In re Cohn, 46 N.J. 202, 216 
A.2d 1 (1966); In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978); NEW MODEL RULES, supra note 7, 
Co=ents at 66. See generally DR 5-105; EC 5-14 & 5-15. 
Canon 5 does not require disqualification when an attorney represents an adverse party 
against the attorney's former client. The duty of loyalty it prescribes runs only to present 
clients. See Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d at 1386; NEW MODEL RULES, supra 
note 7, at§ 1.9 and Co=ents at 80 ("a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for 
a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a wholly distinct 
problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to 
the prior client"); MODEL RULES, supra note 8, at§ 1.10 and Co=ents at 35 ("a lawyer may 
undertake representation adverse to a former client in a matter unrelated to the former repre-
sentation"). But see O'Dea, supra note 3, at 705-08 & n.58 (1980); Co=ent, supra note 3, at 
681 n.17 ("an attorney's Canon 5 duty to serve a client with undivided loyalty survives the 
termination of the attorney-client relationship"). 
70. If the former and current representations concern unrelated matters, canon 4 will not 
automatically require disqualification. Courts will presume the attorney has confidences prej-
udicial to the client only if the attorney formerly represented or currently represents that client 
in a "substantially related" matter. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text. Of course 
even where the matters are not substantially related, the client may offer evidence that the 
attorney actually possesses prejudicial confidences. In either case, the courts will disqualify the 
attorney in an effort to assure that the client's confidences are not used against him. 
71. See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976). 
72. If the latter legal matter is substantially related to the first, a canon 4 problem exists as 
well. 
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well. Neither the existing Code of Professional Responsibility nor 
the new proposed rules address prospective canon 5 waivers.73 This 
section argues that courts should enforce such waivers. 
It is well settled that clients may waive the canon 5 presumption 
of diluted loyalty with respect to a specific, current adverse represen-
tation.74 A specific canon 5 waiver is enforceable even in the ab-
sence of any consideration - an attorney may secure a specific 
canon 5 waiver from a long-standing client simply as a favor to the 
attorney. Prospective canon 5 waivers differ from specific waivers in 
two respects. On the one hand, clients may benefit more from pro-
spective than from specific canon 5 waivers, because a prospective 
waiver ensures clients greater freedom in choosing counsel. On the 
other hand, the client pays a greater price for a canon 5 prospective 
waiver, because there is a greater likelihood that he may someday so 
distrust his attorney's loyalty that he will feel compelled to try to 
disqualify the attorney from simultaneous representation of another 
client. The issue is whether the additional benefit outweighs the ad-
ditional costs. 
By making a prospective waiver of the canon 5 presumption of 
diluted loyalties, a client benefits by getting its choice of counsel. If 
canon 5 prospective waivers were not enforced, a law firm whose 
representation the client desires might refuse to be retained out of 
fear that it would be disqualified from representing parties in unre-
lated litigation against the client as long as its representation of the 
client continued. If waivers were enforced, the expert counsel would 
13. See generally CANON 5; NEW MooEL RULES, supra note 7, at § 1.7 and Comments at 
57-58. However, one court has recently enforced a prospective canon 5 waiver. Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 78 Civ. 1295 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1978). See also 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221,229 (7th Cir. 1978); ABA CoMMN. 
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINION, No. 1323 (1975) (absent canon 4 considera-
tions, a client-specific, prospective canon 5 waiver would be enforceable). 
74. Prospective waivers are directed to future representations in as yet unknown matters. 
By comparison, specific waivers are to present, specific adverse representations. In the case of 
a specific waiver, the attorney can disclose fully its intended role on behalf of the adverse 
party, and the client can readily judge whether that adverse representation will cause the attor-
ney to temper his representation of the client. Consequently, most authorities hold that spe-
cific waivers of the canon 5 right to disqualify an attorney for tempered representation are 
enforceable. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 229 (7th Cir. 
1978) (dicta); IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978) (dicta); Whiting Corp. v, 
White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 1977); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. 
Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193,205 (N.D. Ohio), ajfd. mem., 513 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978) ("It is axiomatic that the client's right to object to an attor-
ney's allegedly adverse representation may be waived."); DR 5-105(c); EC 5-19; MODEL 
RULES, supra note 8, at § 1.8 and Comments at 30 ("A difference of interest is not necessarily 
an improper conflict of interest. When the situation is such that the lawyer's independence of 
judgment is not compromised, the lawyer may properly act if the client consents after being 
adequately informed."). These authorities agree that such waivers should be permitted only if: 
(1) the client consents to the representation after adequate disclosure, and (2) the representa-
tion will not affect the loyalty and careful judgment that the attorney owes both clients. 
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be more likely to accept the client's business.75 Courts could ensure 
that clients receive their choice of counsel as consideration for a pro-
spective waiver by enforcing prospective canon 5 waivers only when 
issued by a new client upon retaining the firm. 76 
Admittedly, a waiver of the canon 5 presumption of diluted loy-
alty also entails costs for the waiving client. In a specific waiver case, 
the attorney must fully disclose to the client the nature of the adverse 
representation. Such disclosure is impossible in a prospective waiver 
case because the waiver covers future representations whose nature 
is not yet known. This difference means that the client can make a 
more informed assessment of its attorney's loyalty in a specific than 
in a prospective waiver case.77 Since the attorney will acquire new 
and unforeseen clients over time, the client issuing a prospective 
waiver is more likely than the client issuing a specific waiver to find 
subsequent cause to mistrust its attorney's loyalty. The client then 
has two options, both of which are costly. One is to seek, without the 
benefit of the presumption of diluted loyalty,78 the attorney's dis-
qualification from the adverse representation. The other is to dis-
charge the attorney, which may be inconvenient and expensive. 79 
However, these costs can be made clear to the client by requiring the 
same safeguards suggested for prospective canon 4 waivers - specif-
ically, that the client obtain the advice of independent counsel and 
execute the waiver in a signed, formal writing. so The client will then 
be able to decide whether the benefits of the representation exceed 
the costs of the waiver. 
Finally, it should be noted that enforcement of prospective canon 
15. See note 6 supra. 
76. Presumably, the law firm will not represent the client without such a waiver. See, e.g., 
the Cleveland Electric case discussed in note 46 supra. The requirement that the waiver be 
enforced only where issued by new clients matches the limitation suggested above for prospec-
tive canon 4 waivers. See text at note 53 supra. 
77. The client will be least able to assess accurately its attorney's loyalty when it first re-
tains the firm. Consequently, specific and prospective canon 5 waivers issued by new clients 
present greater risk than waivers issued by longstanding clients. 
78. If the client can prove that the attorney is actually tempering its representation in the 
umelated matter, then a court should disqualify the attorney from the adverse representation. 
That is, the waiver of the presumption does not waive a client's right to disqualify its attorney 
when the client can prove diluted loyalty. 
19. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Government of 
India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978) (inconvenience and hardship to 
client whose attorney is disqualified). Yet the costs associated with discharging an attorney are 
costs that the client who questions his attorney's loyalty will have to bear even if the attorney is 
disqualified from the adverse representation. It is the threat of disqualification, and not dis-
qualification itself, that safeguards the client's canon 5 rights. The threat of disqualification 
deters attorneys from undertaking such adverse representations. It forces the attorney to elicit 
the consent of the client that the attorney first represents before accepting the adverse represen-
tation. Once the attorney undertakes the adverse representation without the client's consent, 
however, the attorney's eventual disqualification from this representation in no way assures the 
client of his attorney's loyalty. In fact, the disqualification may make the attorney less loyal. 
80. See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text. 
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5 waivers will not significantly undermine public confidence in attor-
ney loyalty. The public will see that the client benefits by waiving 
the presumption of diluted loyalty. And the client remains free to 
prove that the attorney is in fact disloya1.s1 In sum, the interest that 
clients have in retaining counsel of their choices2 outweighs both the 
cost of later having to discharge or disqualify counsel without the 
benefit of the presumption of diluted loyalty, and the marginal effect 
on public confidence in attorney loyalty.s3 In view of all these con-
siderations, courts should enforce prospective waivers of the canon 5 
presumption ~f diluted loyalty. 
CONCLUSION 
Because clients might otherwise be unable to retain counsel of 
their choice, this Note suggests that courts should enforce prospec-
tive waivers of two presumptions: the canon 5 presumption that an 
attorney cannot represent parties in litigation against a present client 
without diluting his loyalty to that client in representation on an un-
related matter, and the canon 4 presumption that an attorney will 
share the confidences of his client with all the other attorneys in his 
firm. The Note suggests a number of safeguards in the execution 
and enforcement of these waivers, safeguards designed to ensure that 
only the presumptions, and not the underlying canon 4 and 5 duties 
of confidentiality and fidelity, are waived. Admittedly, insistence on 
these safeguards may cause clients to turn away from firms that they 
would otherwise retain. But this is a benefit, not a detriment, for the 
courts should discourage clients from risking their canon 4 and 5 
rights where one firm would serve as well as another. Nevertheless, 
where the client feels that representation by a particular attorney or 
law firm is crucial, the courts should not place an absolute bar in the 
way of his quest to retain the counsel of his choice. Enforcement of 
the prospective waivers described in this Note would enable the cli-
ent to obtain counsel of his choice, yet still protect the client's canon 
4 and 5 rights. 
8 l. See note 77 supra. 
82. See Melamed v. IIT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir. 1979). 
83. q: EC 9-2 ("While a lawyer should guard against otherwise proper conduct that has a 
tendency to diminish public confidence in the legal system or in the legal profession, his duty 
to clients or to the public should never be subordinate merely because the full discharge of his 
obligation may be misunderstood or may tend to subject him or the legal profession to criti-
cism."). 
